Florida Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 2

Article 2

January 1977

Constitutional Stay Writ
Jacquelinie R. Griffin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jacquelinie R. Griffin, Constitutional Stay Writ, 29 Fla. L. Rev. 229 (1977).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol29/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Griffin: Constitutional Stay Writ

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STAY WRIT
JACQUELINE

R.

GRlFFIN*

The observation made in the first extraordinary writs symposium that the
constitutional writ of injunction' is the "rarest and least known" 2 of the
Florida writs remains as apt today as when first written twenty-five years ago.
The reason this writ remains so unusual is simply that the circumstances
calling for its use are rarely encountered. 4 More commonly denominated a
"constitutional stay writ," its general purpose is to preserve the status quo
pending a determination of issues before the appellate court, ostensibly to
prevent any action which would render moot or otherwise avoid the effect of an
appellate court's decision while the appeal is pending.6 It has been classically
*BA.,1968, University of North Carolina; M.A.T., 1968; J.D., 1975, University of Florida; Member Florida Bar.
1. Adams & Miller, Origin and Current Status of the Extraordinary Writs, 4 U. FLA. L.
REV. 421, 467 (1951) "Constitutional Writ of Injunction." This source remains the best
analysis of this writ in Florida. Another excellent and more recent discussion is found in
G. MILLER, Extraordinary Writs in Appellate Courts, FLA. CIVIL PRACrICE AFTER TRuAL
§§21.68-.77, at 1214-24 (1966). The Miller article contains a number of suggestions for the
practitioner considering use of this writ. See also 8 FLA. JUR. §82, at 349-51 (1956), 17 FLA.
JUR. §68, at 424 (1958); Wilson, Dreisbach, Brodnax, & Bowen, The Florida Appellate Rules,
11 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1958).
2. Adams & Miller, supra note 1, at 467.
3. In preparation for this discussion, a general search of Florida appellate decisions was
made in an attempt to ascertain the frequency of use of this writ since publication of the first
writs symposium. Fewer than twenty cases referring to this writ were located. This search
was made difficult because most reported cases are not assigned any reference key number for
the stay writ aspect of the opinion. E.g., City of Miami Beach v. Dor Rich, Inc., 289 So. 2d
52 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Tabas v. Hudson, 175 So. 2d 224 (3d D.C.A. Fla), appeal dismissed,
183 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 969 (1966).
4. Resort to the appellate court for this emergency relief is usually obviated by relief
in the form of supersedeas or injunctive relief from the lower court. Thus, classically, it
is the pressing need to preserve the status quo or res pending final appellate resolution of
the legal issues in those rare instances where supersedeas is not effective and the trial
court has refused injunctive relief that calls for this stay writ. Adams & Miller, supra
note 1, at 468, 474; MILLER, supra note 1, at 1215. See also Wingate v. Mach, 114 Ela. 380,
154 So. 192 (1934). Also important to an understanding of the "extraordinary" nature
of this writ is the fact that the Florida Constitution does not authorize the supreme
court and courts of appeal to issue injunctions. Compare FLA. CONST. art. V, §§3, 4 with
FLA. CONST. art. V. §20(3) and FIA. STAT. §26.012(3) (1975).
5. Adams & Miller, supra note 1, at 467.
6. See authorities cited in note 4 supra. The most succinct expression of the court's view
of the applicability of this writ is found in Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla.
407, 410, 140 So. 328, 330 (1932): "The net result of our holding ... is . . . that this court
is not clothed with original jurisdiction of the writ of injunction, that in equity cases it has
appellate jurisdiction only, that by virtue of the quoted provision of the Constitution it is
empowered to and may issue injunctive or any other writs essential to the complete exercise
of its jurisdiction, but that it will not invoke the power so granted except in cases carefully
investigated and a showing made that the writ sought is indispensable to protect the rights of
the party seeking it, or that the law affords no other remedy, or that some constitutional or
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described as a type of "negative supersedeas"'7 and was early viewed as the
affirmative relief available to an appellate court to preserve the subject matter
of the appeal in situations where the lower court had failed or refused such
a result8
Although this basic concept has generally remained constant throughout
the cases, the change that has developed in the modern use of this writ is
primarily one of emphasis. 9 While early Florida cases were painstaking in the
laying of a constitutional foundation for use of this writ and careful to circumscribe its application, 0 modern courts have accepted, almost without comment,
their authority to issue this writ and have applied it more broadly."
Florida courts initially acknowledged that the essential function of an appellate court was to review fully a matter brought before it, and noted that
the power to enjoin prior to review seemed inconsistent with that function.' 2
At the same time, however, courts recognized that the right to preserve the
subject matter of the dispute until ultimate disposition of the litigation was so
fundamental to any meaningful exercise of appellate authority that the right
13
to order a stay flowed almost necessarily from the appellate power.
Authority for Florida appellate courts to issue a constitutional stay writ was
found in the provision of the 1885 Florida Constitution authorizing the
supreme court to issue "all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise
of its jurisdiction." 14 Because the issuance of such an injunction or "stay" was
a recognized "interference," 15 it was held that it should be exercised only to
avoid "irreparable"' 6 injury during the interim between the filing of an appeal
and the final decision thereon and should be granted only in cases of extreme
urgency. 7 Thus its use was primarily to suspend the practical effect of a denial
of injunctive relief below, pending disposition of the appeal.' 8 It was also
established in the early cases that writs, such as the stay writ, authorized by
the "necessary or proper" constitutional authority are, by definition, ancillary

statutory provision is about to be violated, or that the rights in litigation are of such peculiar
or intrinsic value or nature that the facts of the case make it imperative that they be held
in status quo pending the adjudication of the cause on appeal."
7. Adams & Miller, supra note 1, at 468. See also Anderson v. Tower Amusement Co.,
118 Fla. 437, 441 n.1, 159 So. 782, 784 n.l (1935).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Tabas v. Hudson, 175 So. 2d 224 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), appeal dismissed, 183 So.
2d 209 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 969 (1966); Engel v. City of North Miami, 111 So. 2d
92 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
10. See discussion in Adams & Miller, supra note I, at 468-72 and cases cited therein.
11. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 24, 28, 50 infra.
12. See Astca Inv. Co. v. Lake County, 86 Fla. 639, 98 So. 824 (1922); Cohen v. L'Engle,
24 Fla. 542, 5 So. 235 (1888).
13. Id.
14. FLA. CONST. art. V, §4(2) (1885).

15. Wingate v. Mach, 114 la. 380, 383, 154 So. 192, 193 (1934).
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Adams & Miller, supra note 1, at 468.
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and can only be utilized where the appellate court already has jurisdiction over
a matter. 9
Since the publication of the first writs symposium in 1951, the 1885 Constitution was amended to create an intermediate appellate court; 20 and subsequent to the major constitutional revisions in 1968, article V of the Florida
Constitution was again revised in 1972, altering the all writs authority from
"necessary or proper" to merely "necessary." 2 ' Although these changes have
been substantial, they appear to have had little effect on the constitutional stay
writ, and have passed virtually without comment. The district courts of appeal
have moved easily into use of the stay writ, and introduction of these courts
into the appellate hierarchy seems virtually to have eliminated the occasion
for use of this writ by the high court.2 2 The 1973 deletion of the authority to
issue writs that are "proper" to the complete exercise of jurisdiction does not
appear to have been directed at the constitutional stay writ, and has resulted
in no observable changes. Even though early courts had referred to the "necessary or proper" language as authority for the extreme measure of injunctive
relief they felt constrained to invoke by use of this writ, the language of those
cases reveals almost universal accord that, when used, the stay writ was in fact
necessary for the complete exercise of the appellate court's jurisdiction.23
What is notable about contemporary use of the constitutional stay writ is
the confidence, even alacrity, with which it is now utilized.24 This writ has, for
many years now, been recognized and procedurally controlled by appellate
19. E.g., State ex rel. Watson v. Lee, 150 Fla. 496, 8 So. 2d 19 (1942). See notes 61-68
infra and accompanying text.
20.

See FLA. CONST. art. V, §5 (1956).

21. FLA. CONST. art. V, §(b)(4); §4(b)(8).
22. A tally sheet of cases added to the docket of the Florida supreme court in the three
preceding years, prepared by the clerk of the supreme court, of the number of cases filed
in approximately thirty categories reveals the following:
1974: New filings - 1883; applications for stay writ - 1
1975: New filings - 1947; applications for stay writ - 1
1976: January term only:
New filings - 1141; constitutional writs - 3
It should be pointed out that in 1974 and 1975, these tally sheets differentiate between "stay
writs" and constitutional writs (of which there were two and one respectively). In 1976, there
was no separate listing for stay writs. This either means that the stay writs have been merged
with the constitutional writs for counting purposes, or there were no stay writs applied for in
the 1976 January term.
23. But cf. Wingate v. Mach, 114 Fla. 380, 888, 154 So. 192, 193 (1984).
24. A good example can be found in Bazzano v. Bazzano, 175 So. 2d 801 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1965), wherein the Third District Court of Appeal had before it on interlocutory appeal the
lower court's modification of a final divorce decree to restrain the former husband from
"assualting [sic], harassing, annoying or berating" the appellee-former wife. The issue on
appeal seems to have been the correctness of a denial of a motion to dismiss the petition for
modification. A Rule 4.5(g) constitutional writ was applied for, granted, and the case expedited
for hearing. FLA. APP. R. 4.5(g) (1962). It is not clear from the case that a "stay" was what
was actually sought; or if so, what was sought to be stayed or by whom application was made.
Nor does it appear there was any reason to expedite the appeal, for the order appealed from
merely restrained the husband from "assualting [sic], harassing, annoying or berating" the
appellee-former wife. The court, on expediting hearing, found the trial court's order to have
been proper, and affirmed.
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rule.25 Courts may have gradually come to equate this rule recognition with a
sanction of its general correctness as an appellate tool. In any case, when this
25. The use of the constitutional stay writ was incorporated into R. PRAC. Sup. CT. FLA.
33 (1942) as follows: "CONSTITUTIONAL STAY WRITS. (a) After Appeal and Notice.
Application for constitutional or other writs necessary to complete exercise of the jurisdiction
of this court will be entertained only after the required notice herein to the adverse party,
unless such requirement be modified. No such petition will be entertained unless an appeal
has been perfected in this court and then it must clearly appear that supersedeas will not
completely preserve the court's jurisdiction. (b) Final Adjudication on Merits. When. If it
develops on the application for the writ that the ends of justice will be best served by disposing of the cause on the merits, the court will so determine and permit counsel to file
briefs, but no further argument will be permitted." The rule language was modified in 1955
to read: "CONSTITUTIONAL WRITS 1. After Appeal and Notice. Application for constitutional or other writs necessary to the complete exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court will
be entertained only after five days' notice to the adverse party, unless such requirement is
modified. No such petition will be entertained unless an appeal has been perfected in this
Court and then only when it is made clearly to appear that a supersedeas order entered by
the court below will not completely preserve this Court's jurisdiction, or that the court below
has erroneously refused to enter such an order. 2. Final Adjudication on Merits. When. If it
should develop on the application for the writ that the ends of justice will be best served by
disposing of the cause on the merits, the Court will so determine, allow the attorneys time to
file briefs, and dispose of the cause on the merits without further arguments. R. PRAc. Sup.
CT. FLA. 26 (1955). In 1962, the rule language was again altered in the general revision of
the appellate rules: "CONSTITUTIONAL WRITS. (1) After Appeal and Notice. Application
for constitutional or other writs necessary to the complete exercise of the jurisdiction of the
Court will be entertained only after reasonable notice to the adverse party. No such petition
will be entertained unless an appeal has been commenced, and then only when it is made
clearly to appear that a supersedeas order entered by the lower court will not completely
preserve the Court's jurisdiction, or that the lower court has erroneously refused to enter such
and order. (2) Final Adjudication on Merits. When. If it should develop on the application
for the writ that the ends of justice will be best served by disposing of the cause on the
merits, the Court will so determine, allow the attorneys time to file briefs, and dispose of
the cause on the merits without further arguments." FLA. App. R. 4.5(g) (1962). In 1968, the
supreme court modified this language to read: "CONSTITUTIONAL 'WRITS. (1) In Aid of
Prescribed Jurisdiction. Application for constitutional or other writs necessary to the complete
exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court will be entertained only after reasonable notice to
the adverse party. No such petition will be entertained unless the case is one in which the
Court may properly acquire jurisdiction and then only when it is made clearly to appear that
the writ is in fact necessary in aid of an ultimate power of review and that a supersedeas
order entered by the lower court will not completely perserve the Court's jurisdiction, or that
the lower court has erroneously refused to enter such an order." FLA. App. R. 4.5(g) (1968).
In re Florida Appellate Rules, 211 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1968). This is the rule currently in
effect. See also Couse v. Canal Authority, 209 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1968). Finally, the language of
the new proposed appellate rule pertaining to constitutional writs also has some changes in
its language. "CONSTITUTIONAL WRITS IN AID OF JURISDICTION (1) Constitutional
writs necessary to the complete exercise of the appellate court's jurisdiction will be considered
only after reasonable notice to adverse parties. No proceeding will be considered unless it is
one in which the appellate court may properly acquire jurisdiction and only when it
clearly appears that the writ is necessary to aid an ultimate power of the appellate court
and that supersedeas will not preserve the jurisdiction of the appellate court. (2) Proceedings
shall be by motion as provided in Rule 9.110 but the appellate court may act on the motion
before receiving a response. (3) If the appellate court determines at the hearing that justice
will be best served by disposing of the case on the merits, it shall so order and briefs shall
be served in accordance with Rule 9.140, and the case may be determined on the merits.
Proposed FLA. Apr. R. 9.270(h).
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writ is now employed by the appellate courts, it is the appellate rule that is
usually cited rather than the early cases. 26 Unfortunately, the courts hardly
discuss their decision to grant or deny the writ.27
Further, application for such a stay writ is usually simply converted into an
accelerated disposition of the cause on its merits pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Rule 4.5(g). 28 The Rule 4.5(g) expediting procedure evolved out of concern
that the appellate courts remain essentially courts of review. If the appellate
court, upon initial examination of a matter claimed to require its injunctive
intervention, finds a matter that can be substantially aided by a rapid determination, and that does not present issues that are complex or of great public
interest, it can utilize the expediting procedure. This approach satisfies the
need for prompt appellate action without the violation of the court's review
function that could result from issuance of the peremptory stay.
Both the liberality of modem usage of the stay writ and the concern with
the effect of appellate stay orders are demonstrated by comparison of two
relatively recent cases, State ex rel. Miami HeraldPublishing Co. v. Rose29 and
State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh. 0 Both cases involve
challenges to trial court orders restricting activities of the news media in reporting on criminal trials in progress. The Rose case was before the Second
District Court of Appeal on a suggestion for writ of prohibition to prohibit
enforcement of the trial court's restrictive order.8 1 In a very short opinion, the
court noted that the order below was invalid to the extent that it operated as a
26. The rule itself ratifies the validity of the writ as a tool available to the appellate
court, and so limits its application that an appellate court is not likely to exceed its authority.
4
FLA. App. R. .5(g).
27. E.g., Pickerill v. Schott, 55 So. 2d 716, 718 (1951); Zucker v. Furlong, 164 So. 2d 847
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
28. For example, in Tabas v. Hudson, 175 So. 2d 224 (3d D.C.A.), appeal dismissed, 183
So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 969 (1966), the Third District Court of Appeal
had before it for review an order of commitment for appellants' contempt in failing to remove an encroachment they had been enjoined to remove by the chancellor below. After
denial of a supersedeas by the chancellor, appeal was commenced and a constitutional stay
writ applied for. The Third District Court stayed the effect of the commitment order pending
determination on the merits and expedited filing of briefs. The Court then proceeded to
find incarceration of appellant constitutionally impermissible under the facts of that case
and reversed the commitment portion of the chancellor's order. The writ and expediting
procedure were employed without comment; but the court was careful to note that supersedeas
had been denied below, thus giving rise to the classic circumstances for use of the writ.
The Third District Court again utilized Rule 4 .5(g) expediting procedure in Merrell v.
Dade County Canvassing Board, 300 So. 2d 28 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974). This time the court was
faced with a question of primary election procedure that needed to be resolved prior to the
date scheduled for run-off elections. The petitioner had requested an injunction, apparently
to prohibit the election until an adverse determination of his rights had been reviewed by
the appellate court. There is no evidence of denial of injunction or supersedeas below. As
an alternative to issuing an injunction and hearing the case in turn, the court expedited
hearing on the merits and reversed the trial court's ruling on the merits. See also Cuban Air
Force, F.A.R. v. Bergstresser, 135 So. 2d 752 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
29. 271 So. 2d 483 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
30. 322 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1975).
31. State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Rose, 271 So. 2d 483, 483 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
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32
prior restraint on constitutionally privileged publication or communication.
For some reason unexplained in the opinion, the court rejected the use of
prohibition; instead, it elected to utilize the Rule 4.5(g) procedure and stay
33
the order under attack.
When faced with a similar restrictive order in a criminal trial in Palm
Beach County, the petitioner in McIntosh requested the Fourth District Court
of Appeal to expedite review of the trial judge's order through application for
a writ of prohibition.34 The court denied the suggestion for writ of prohibition
and the trial proceeded under the "gag" order. 35 The Miami Herald then
appealed to the supreme court, again requesting prohibition and mandamus,
as well as a stay order.3 6
The supreme court initially noted that because mandamus and prohibition
had been requested before the Fourth District Court of Appeal, and had been
denied, they were not available as remedies to the supreme court.3 7 Thus, the
only question considered in the high court's opinion was the propriety of a
Rule 4.5(g) stay order. The court noted the tremendous effect that the stay
order might have on the trial in progress as well as on other criminal trials of
public interest; and further observed that, because of the time required to
examine the important question of law involved, its ruling could not be made
prior to the end of the criminal trial.3 Moreover, the court expressed its
concern about the advisability of issuing a stay without full review of the
arguments on the merits by both parties.3 9 Instead the supreme court treated
the petition for a stay order as a petition for conflict certiorari and ordered an
40
expedited filing of briefs and oral argument.
One of the very few modern cases found where the Supreme Court of
Florida has actually granted a constitutional stay writ was the 1968 case of
Petit v. Adams. 41 This case was brought before the supreme court on a petition
for alternative writ of mandamus against the Secretary of State and a county
canvassing board, seeking to compel the canvassing board to re-count ballots
cast in the primary election. The supreme court initially noted that there was
extreme doubt whether it had jurisdiction over the proceedings. 42 Because the
Dade County Canvassing Board intended to erase the voting machines immediately, however, which would have effectively deprived the court of the
complete exercise of its putative jurisdiction, the court cited its constitutional

32. Id. at 484.
33. Id.
34. State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. McIntosh, 322 So. 2d 544,
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 547.
39. Id.
40. Conflict was identified to exist with the Rose opinion. See text
29-39 supra. The constitutional issue was not mentioned in the majority
Boyd, writing in dissent, the constitutional question was primary and he
322 So. 2d at 549 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
41. 211 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1968).
42. ld. at 566.
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power under article V, section 4 of the Florida Constitution and issued a constitutional writ staying or enjoining the erasure of the voting results. 43 The
court then allowed four days for the parties to prepare further argument on
the question of the court's jurisdiction. After hearing argument, the court determined that it was without jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings in
application for mandamus. 4" It further found that it had no alternative but to
vacate its earlier orders staying the erasure of voting results.45
The opinion of the supreme court in Petit v. Adams reflects a number of
characteristics of the modern constitutional stay writ. First, the court clearly
considered as crucial the imminent and irreparable harm that would be done
unless the status quo were preserved pending a fuller determination of the
various issues in dispute between the parties. Also, it is notable that the court
fashioned Rule 4.5(g) injunctive relief on its own motion, absent an application by the parties, at least insofar as the opinion reflects. Finally, the court
acknowledged that by vacating its previous orders staying destruction of
the voting results upon a finding that it had no jurisdiction, the petitioner
would probably be left without remedy since he would be unable to get
other injunctive relief before respondent erased the machines. 46 This clearly
reflects the court's view that its jurisdiction to issue such injunctive relief is
purely ancillary to the main proceeding 47 The court found that it had no
choice but to vacate its stay order when it determined that it had no jurisdiction, which comports with classic notions of the ancillary nature of this writ.
The only other recent discussion of appellate authority to entertain and
issue constitutional writs of injunction was addressed in the dissent of
Justice England in the 1975 case of Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v.
Data Lease Financial Corp.48 Discussing the nature of the injunctive relief
sought to be protected by the petitioner, Justice England stated his view of the
current status of the constitutional stay writ:

43. Id.
44. Id. at 568-69.

45. Id. at 568.
46. Id., see also id. at 570 (Adams, J., dissenting).
47. It is interesting that the Petit v. Adams case is not the standard example of an appellate court issuing injunctive relief as a result of denial of relief in the court below, because in the Petit case, there was no inferior court involved. The supreme court had been
applied to as a court of original jurisdiction and the supreme court believed it was authorized
as the original court to issue injunctive relief in order to preserve its potential jurisdiction.
48. 328 So. 2d 825, 828 (Fla. 1975) (England, J., dissenting). In Blackhawk, the supreme

court was faced with review of a trial court order dissolving a temporary injunction that had
earlier been issued by the trial court, dissolved by the district court of appeal, and finally
reinstated by the supreme court. The issue before the court was whether the trial court was
authorized to vacate the temporary injunction, and the majority of the court found that it
was not. The subject of Justice England's dissent was his distinction between a reinstatement of a trial court's temporary injunction and the issuance of an injunction of its own.
Justice England argued that because the supreme court did no more than reinstate the trial
court's injunction, the trial court had jurisdiction to modify the injunction or vacate it as it

thought proper. The majority opinion reflected the notion that once the injunction was
mandated by the supreme court, the trial court no longer was authorized to alter it.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

While this court undoubtedly has initial injunctive powers, they exist in
the limited context of an aid to our constitutional jurisdiction under
Article V, §3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution (1973). These powers
typically arise where the lower court refuses to act in the first instance, as
in Anderson v. Tower Amusement Co. [citation omitted], or where we
attempt to preserve the status quo until the end of our appellate review.
See State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski [citation omitted].4 9
Although it is plain from a reading of the cases that courts sometimes consider
additional factors, Justice England's statement appears to be an accurate generalization of the utility of the constitutional stay writ in modern Florida
jurisprudence.
Modern cases that have employed the constitutional stay writ help to demonstrate the broadened application this writ has been given by modern
courts.5° The Third District Court of Appeal perceived the utility of Rule
51
4.5(g) injunctive relief in Royal Services, Inc. v. Williams. This action had
been brought against a former employee and his present employer alleging a
breach of a contract not to compete. The trial court had found that the contract was unenforceable, which the appellate court ruled was error. The problem presented, however, was that the noncompetition agreement was for a
stated period of time which had elapsed during the course of the appeal. The
Third District Court initially noted that the trial court could have and should
have enforced the contract by injunction, although the opinion does not reflect
that an injunction below had been requested. The court goes on in dictum to
point out to the parties that if such a preliminary injunction had been denied
by the trial court it would have been available from the appellate court on
proper showing, pursuant to Rule 4.5(g). 5 2 It may be significant that this most
recent case discussing the constitutional stay writ attempts to inform counsel
of the availability and beneficial use of this extraordinary remedy.
Although Florida appellate courts have been ready to utilize the constitutional stay writ in a wide variety of circumstances, they have also found denial
of this extraordinary relief more appropriate in certain cases even when
4
specifically requested.53 In Engel v. City of North Miami,5 officers and em-

49. 328 So. 2d at 829 n.9.
50. A succinct example of the current use of this writ can be seen in the very short
opinion of Zucker v. Furlong, 164 So. 2d 847 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963). In a short per curiam
opinion, the court noted that the appellant had moved the court to vacate judgment in
garnishment or to permit the funds held by the garnishee to be transferred to the registry
of the civil court of record pending the outcome of the appeal. It appears that such a
garnishment action based on the trial court's judgment was pending concurrently with the
appeal. The Third District Court of Appeal treated the motion as one for a constitutional
stay writ and summarily enjoined any further proceedings in garnishment before the civil
court of record until the district court determination of the main appeal.
51. 334 So. 2d 154 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1976).
52. Id. at 158.
53. In one rather odd case. City of Miami Beach v. Lansburgh, 217 So. 2d 348 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1969), the appellate court denied a petition for a stay writ applied for by the city to
avoid a trial court's injunction against the tourist board. Even though a statute then in
effect provided for an automatic stay of the lower court's order upon the city's appeal, the
city requested a specific stay from the appellate court. The district court denied the re-
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ployees of the Police Department of the City of North Miami had specifically
requested a constitutional stay writ on the basis that it was necessary in order
to preserve the subject matter of the controversy pending the outcome of the
appeal. Although the court found that it had unquestioned authority to issue
such a writ, the type of relief requested was found to be too drastic. Injunctive
relief would have required that the transfer of police functions to county government in accordance with the administrative determination of the city's
governing body and the lower court ruling be enjoined. Alluding to the problem of directing such injunctive relief prior to a hearing on the merits of the
case, the court stated:
Extraordinary relief of such drastic character as that which is requested
by this application for constitutional writ should never be granted except in cases of extreme urgency where it is made to appear to tie appellate court that the constitutional writ should be issued in advance of
a determination of an appeal on its merits in order that appellants may
not suffer irreparable injury during the interim between the entry of
appeal and the final decision of the appellate court. 55
The court concluded that the application for such a writ failed to disclose,
under the circumstances, that it was either necessary or proper to the complete
exercise of the court's jurisdiction that such drastic relief be ordered.56
This reluctance to grant the "drastic" relief of a constitutional stay writ was
again reflected, and further elaborated, by the First District Court of Appeal
in Board of Public Instructionv. Board of County Commissioners.57 This case
presented a classic situation for a constitutional stay writ since the injunctive
quested relief, apparently not so much because it would have been superfluous as because
the court did not view the continued functioning of the tourist board to be a matter that
would render subsequent proceedings in the case ineffectual or result in undue harm. Id. at
849-50.
Another such instance was the case of Pickerill v. Schott, 55 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1951),
wherein the plaintiff had sued the Director of the State Beverage Department, attacking
the constitutionality of the "tied house evil" law by which manufacturers and wholesalers of intoxicating liquor were prohibited from having financial interest in retailers'
operations. The law also limited the extension of credit to retailers to a period of only ten
days from date of the sale. If payment were not made under the statute within ten days, the
Beverage Director was authorized to prohibit further sales to said retailer. The petitioner was
a retailer who had not made timely payment as required by the statute. The appellants filed
suit for injunctive relief to stay any action by the Beverage Director to prohibit further sales
to petitioner. Relief was denied.
The petitioner then appealed and also requested a constitutional writ to stay the enforcement of the act and the orders of the Beverage Director concerning sales pending the
outcome of the appeal. Id.at 717. Although the circumstances of this case seemed to fall
within the class of cases where such a constitutional stay writ would be appropriately issued,
the court denied the requested injunctive relief, but did not elaborate on its reasons. The
court then proceeded to affirm the trial court's actions in denying injunctive relief and dismissing the complaint. Id. at 720.
54. 111 So. 2d 92 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
55. Id. at 94.
56.

Id.

57. 192 So. 2d 321 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
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relief requested, i.e., enjoining the county tax collector from certifying tax
millage for the county school board, on any basis other than that approved by
the State Superintendent, had been denied by the trial court. 58 Interestingly,
rather than examining the real need for such relief and the possible irreparable
harm that could result from its denial the First District Court emphasized that
the issuance of the stay would necessarily postpone the payment of taxes in the
county for many months, causing a hardship on the various agencies of county
government and creating a "chaotic condition." 9 Concluding that it would be
unfair to impose such an "intolerable condition" upon governmental agencies
of Duval County, the court denied injunctive relief. 60
A final characteristic of the constitutional stay writ that has remained constant throughout its development has been its ancillary character. Unless the
court already has jurisdiction over a matter, or can properly acquire jurisdiction, the writ is unavailable.61 This principle was made clear in the early
Florida supreme court case of State ex rel. Watson v. Lee,.62 and is confirmed by
the express language of the appellate rule. 63
58. Id. at 322-23.
59. Id. at 323.
60. Id.
4
61. FLA. App. R. .5(g).
62. 150 Fla. 496, 8 So. 2d 19 (1942). In Cousc v. Canal Authority, 209 So. 2d 865 (Fla.
1968), the Supreme Court of Florida overruled Watson insofar as it stated that the "all writs"
provision could not be invoked until jurisdiction is acquired over a cause by means of independent appellate proceedings. The court substituted the "ultimate power of review"
language in order to extend the "all writs" power to cases in which appeal had not been
perfected because no final judgment had been entered. In Couse, the court was faced with
a petition for certiorari to review an interlocutory order authorizing transfer of possession
and title in an eminent domain proceeding. This enlargement of jurisdictional definition is
less relevant to the stay writ than to certiorari. The granting or denial of injunctive relief is
appealable pursuant to FLx. Ai'. R. 4.2, and subject to supersedeas as provided by FLA. App.
R. 5.1, Wilson v. Sandstrom, ;17 So. 2d 732, 740 (Fla. 1975). Thus, typically, the stay writ
will be appropriate either after application for injunctive relief below (orders on which are
appealable) or after entry of judgment in an action by a trial court that requires injunctive
intervention by the appellate court to preserve the subject matter. Cf. Royal Services, Inc. v.
Williams, 334 So. 2d 154, 157 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1976).
4
63. FLA. App. R. .5(g). In 1974 the Supreme Court of Florida decided the case of Monroe
Education Ass'n v. Clerk, District Court of Appeal, Third District, 299 So. 2d I (Fla. 1974).
In that case, the court was faced with the question whether a writ authorized by the "all
writs" language of article V, 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution was only available where
jurisdiction was already acquired "by means of independent appellate proceedings." Id. at 2.
The supreme court found that the district court did have jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus in "extraordinary circumstances involving great public interest where emergencies
and seasonable considerations are involved that require expedition." Id. at 3. Recently, however, in the case of Shevin v. Public Service Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1976), Justice
Hatchett stated that the "all writs clause" conferred jurisdiction on the court only in situations where the court already had acquired jurisdiction of a cause on some independent basis
and that complete exercise of that jurisdiction might be defeated if the court did not issue
an appropriate writ. Although it is difficult to reconcile the language of these two cases, it is
unlikely that the constitutional stay writ would be sought in any circumstances other than in
aid of ancillary relief, because of the specific language of the appellate rule controlling use
of the stay writ; and more important, because the very essence of this writ is to preserve the
res while a main appellate proceeding is concluded.
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The recently proposed changes in the language of the appellate rule governing the use of constitutional writs in aid of jurisdiction will have little effect
on its use. 4 The language in the new version of this appellate rule is somewhat
different from the present language; however, many of the changes appear to
reflect a desire to modernize and simplify the language of the rule, rather than
to alter its substance.6 5 To fully appreciate the proposed changes as well as to
better understand the operative elements of this rule, it is instructive to compare closely the evolving language of the rule governing the stay writ since it
was first incorporated into the appellate rules in 1942.66
The rule initially required that an appeal have been perfected, and that it
clearly appear supersedeas would not preserve the court's jurisdiction. The
1955 rule continued the requirement of a perfected appeal but added an
allowance for use of the writ where the lower court had erroneously refused
to render a supersedeas order.67 Subsequently, the first requirement was relaxed
to allow the writ as soon as the appeal had been commenced. 68 Later, this first
requirement was broadened still further to include situations where the appellate court might "properly acquire jurisdiction" 69 on the condition that it
dearly appear the writ would be necessary in aid of an ultimate power of
70
review.
The proposed revision makes changes in both of the basic elements of this
writ. The "ultimate power of review" phrase has been modified to read "ultimate power of the appellate court."7' This change in language on its face
broadens jurisdiction by rejecting the "review" limitation, but it is difficult to
perceive precisely how this would affect the stay writ. Because the appellate
courts have some limited functions that could be classified as other than "review," 72 this change appears to authorize injunctive (stay writ) intervention in
such instances.
Also, the provision that the constitutional stay writ would be authorized
when the lower court had erroneously refused to order supersedeas has now
been removed from the proposed rule. Presumably, this deletion is the result of
the fact that the appellate rules already provide a procedure for review of the
lower court's refusal to grant a supersedeas or stay.73 Under the proposed rule,
an erroneous denial of supersedeas by the lower court would give rise to review
of the supersedeas denial by motion from the aggrieved party. 74 If the pro-

64. The current and proposed rules are set forth in note 25 supra.
65. For example, "made dearly to appear" has become "dearly appears." The change
from "will be entertained" to "will be considered" is not of any substance other than

stylistic.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

R. PRAC. Sup. CT. FLA. 33 (1942). See text quoted in full at note 25 supra.
R. PRAC. Sup. Cr. FLA. 26 (1955). See text quoted at note 25 supra.
Former FLA. App. R. 4.5(g) (1962).
FLA. App. R. 4.5(g).
Id.
Proposed FLA. APP. R. 9.270(h)(1).

72. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§3, 4.
73. See FLA. Ai'. R. 5.10.
74. Proposed FLA. App. R. 9.100(i).
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posed rule is adopted, the only basis for a stay writ will be when supersedeas is
inadequate to preserve the court's perceived jurisdiction.
Finally, the new appellate rule has added the proviso that the petition for
the constitutional writ shall be made by simple motion, as provided by the new
appellate Rule 9.110.75 The rule further provides, however, that the appellate
court may act on the motion for constitutional writ before receiving a response
from any other interested party.76 Because the few Florida cases that have
undertaken any discussion of constitutional stay writs have paid little or no
attention to the language of the appellate rule governing the procedure or the
changes made over time to the rule, it is not anticipated that the changes in
the new Rule 9.270(h) will affect the current status of the writ or the way in
which it is utilized.
Examination of the modern cases dealing with the constitutional stay writs
seems to indicate that the writ is now readily accepted as a device available for
use Florida appellate courts. It can be inferred from the dirth of commentary, both in case law and by Florida legal scholars, that use of this writ is
no longer perceived to present the conceptual problems that were identified
and examined in earlier Florida cases, and that the proper procedure for use of
the writ is sufficiently well defined by appellate rule. Because the instances requiring the aid of a constitutional stay writ do not often arise and because the
mechanisms of supersedeas and other rules provisions are generally adequate to
suspend the harmful effects of adverse rulings below until appellate review is
complete, the constitutional stay writ will likely remain unfamiliar. Nevertheless, for those rare instances where injunctive relief is required in order to
preserve the subject matter of an appellate court's jurisdiction until it has had
the opportunity to dispose of a case on its merits, it seems by now well established that the appellate courts of Florida have such power in the form of a
constitutional stay writ and that the court's own determination of how, and
under what circumstances, that writ may issue will be broadly determined in
line with the language of the applicable appellate rule.
75. Proposed FLA. App. R. 9.270(h)(2).

76. Id.
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